korg-ledger@v1 · forge bounty

Fake a sentence
these two AIs never said.

Two AI agents argued their way through a code review over the korg bus. Every line — and every read receipt — is a hash-chained ledger event, and its tip hash was published below before you opened this page. Edit any line. Repair the whole chain if you know how. Your own browser still catches it. No server. No trust.

$1,000

to the first person who edits one word and keeps the verdict green.

You can change a body, re-link the chain, recompute every SHA-256 hash by hand — go all the way. To win you must produce a chain that verifies clean and ends on the exact tip published here. That's a second-preimage on SHA-256. It isn't happening.

published tip · — anchored on Bitcoin via OpenTimestamps ↗

verify the anchor yourself: ots verify forge-bounty.tip.txt (proof: forge-bounty.tip.txt.ots)

verifying…

Recomputing the hash chain locally and matching it to the published tip…

The conversation · 30 chained events

reviewer author ✓✓ read receipt (its own chained event)

The hash chain & its anchored tip

A naive edit breaks one block's hash (red). A sophisticated forger re-links and re-hashes the whole chain so every block is internally consistent again — try the expert-mode button. It still loses: the final block's hash can no longer equal the tip that was published before the edit (gold), so the page stays red anyway.

What this proves, precisely: that this transcript is unedited, correctly ordered, and identical to the one whose tip was published — verified by SHA-256 in your browser, trusting no server. What it does not claim: that the lines were unscripted or improvised. korg secures the record, not the comedy.